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Showing posts with label Saadya Gaon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saadya Gaon. Show all posts

Tuesday, 20 December 2011

Judaism and Philosophical Speculation

I was recently asked to write an article of philosophical interest for a Jewish publication. The content is aimed at the lay-person, but perhaps people here will find it interesting. I'd be grateful, as ever, for your comments.
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As a modern orthodox Jew, I am keenly aware of the value and weight that we place upon secular studies and rational inquiry. This emphasis is one of the key features that distinguishes our community from other varieties of orthodoxy. For that reason, we must be certain to pay attention to a certain Mishna, the first Mishna in the second chapter of tractate Haggiga. As we’ll see, it looks like a Mishna that’s specifically aimed at forbidding the study of philosophy and limiting our freedom of thought.

Saturday, 15 October 2011

Symposium: Eleonore Stump

The symposium on Eleonore Stump's paper, "Saadia Gaon on The Problem of Evil" (Faith and Philosophy 1997, Vol. 14, No. 4: 523-49), is now underway.  Prof. Stump has kindly agreed to participate in the Symposium.  In what follows, I replicate the abstract of the paper, a brief summary and a series of questions to get things started.

Friday, 14 October 2011

Stump Symposium on Evil: A Few Questions

I'm wondering if anyone can help me with these clarificatory questions that have arisen after reading Professor Stump's thoroughly interesting article.

1) As Stump presents Saadia, he is of the opinion that those who are mostly righteous are punished in this world so that their remaining sins do not prevent them from enjoying eternal reward. I'm left wondering when God decides to enact this punishment? Here's the problem I see. Suppose person S qualifies as one of Saadia's (mostly) righteous. Suppose S is 70 years old. Now, assuming 70 still has time to repent for her remaining sins, there still remains time for S to forestall punishment due for those sins. But once God punishes S for those sins so as to ensure S gets eternal reward, God has closed off the opportunity to S to repent. Is this a problem or is Saadia happy to accept that God knows in advance that S will not repent for those sins and hence undertakes to punish S during the remaining years of her life?

2) On page 537, Saadia is presented as understanding a trial to be undertaken by God if and only if God knows that the agent will endure it. Does Saadia have anything to say on the following verse in Genesis found after Abraham had passed his trial "Do not stretch your hand against the lad ... for NOW I KNOW that you are a God-fearing man" (22: 12). In other words, the verse seems to indicate that trials do not involve God's knowing the result of the trial. I realize that this point opens up the God and time can of worms, but I find it an interesting component of what a trial is and therefore a hinge on which a theodicy must swing.

3) Assumedly a trial of a seemingly innocent person will engender doubts or questions about either God's being just or God's existence in those around him. This feature of evil is demonstrate, I think, quite nicely by the conversational nature of Job and the traditions in the Midrash that Sarah died upon hearing that Abraham had "killed" Isaac. Can Saadia account for the "collateral damage" of a trial on those around the tested individual? Surely those seeing a seemingly righteous person suffer aren't themselves being punished or punished for the sake of future rewards. Are they enduring this evil for the sake of character building, Saadia's second category? Would this be a suitable answer from Saadia?

Dani

Wednesday, 21 September 2011

The Kuzari Principle

There is an argument known as the Kuzari Principle. It tries to justify belief in whole swathes of the Biblical narrative, especially in the revelation at Mount Sinai. In this blog post, I hope to show that the argument is much stronger than it might seem. The name of the argument is slightly unfair, as it was first put forward not in R. Yehuda Halevi's Kuzari, but in Saadya Gaon's Emunot Vadeot.